Kordofan Emerges as Sudan War's Central Front as Drone Strikes Intensify
The Kordofan region has become one of the most fiercely contested theatres in Sudan's civil war, emerging as a strategic corridor connecting the army-controlled centre and east wit
The Kordofan region has become one of the most fiercely contested theatres in Sudan's civil war, emerging as a strategic corridor connecting the army-controlled centre and east with the paramilitary-held west. Comprising North, West and South Kordofan states, the vast territory sits at the junction where the areas of control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) meet, making it a natural focal point for fighting now in its fourth year.
According to an analysis by Al Jazeera drawing on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED), an independent conflict monitor, Kordofan has recorded 2,876 attacks since the war erupted on April 15, 2023 — roughly 19.7 percent of all recorded attacks nationwide. That places the region behind only the capital, Khartoum, when its three states are counted together, underscoring how the conflict has spread far beyond its initial flashpoints.
Nationwide, ACLED data shows 14,648 recorded attacks between the start of the war and September 19, 2026. Khartoum accounts for the largest share by far, with 5,719 attacks, or 39 percent of the total — nearly three times the figure for North Darfur, the second most affected area with 1,999 attacks (13.7 percent). Gezira state recorded 1,435 attacks (9.8 percent). Yet it is Kordofan's combined toll that has drawn increasing attention from observers tracking the war's shifting geography.
The broader military picture in Sudan remains divided. The SAF holds Khartoum and most of the north, east and centre of the country, while the RSF controls the western regions, including almost all of Darfur and parts of Kordofan. Smaller armed factions, among them the RSF-allied Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), retain pockets of territory in the south. The army maintains the advantage in the north, the RSF dominates the west, and South Kordofan remains actively contested ground.
Within Kordofan itself, the three states recorded 2,717 attacks: North Kordofan registered 1,205, or 44 percent of the regional total; South Kordofan saw 789; and West Kordofan recorded 723. When Abyei — a disputed, oil-rich area on the Sudan-South Sudan border historically considered part of Kordofan — is included, the combined figure rises to 2,878.
The pattern of violence varies considerably from state to state. In North Kordofan, Sheikan locality alone accounted for 497 attacks, representing 41 percent of the state's total. Sheikan contains the state capital, el-Obeid, a commercial and administrative hub that links central Sudan with the west. Analysts note that seizing the city would open a route eastward toward Khartoum for the RSF, giving the location outsized strategic value.
Much of the recent fighting has been waged from the air. Drone strikes on towns across North Kordofan have grown more frequent and more deadly, and civilian infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed throughout the region. The increasing reliance on aerial attacks reflects a broader shift in the conflict's character, with both sides investing heavily in unmanned systems capable of striking deep behind front lines.
The human cost of those strikes was vividly illustrated on September 9, when a drone attack on a college in el-Obeid ripped the roof off a building and killed a security guard. Abdel Aziz al-Sheikh, the college's dean, confirmed the death to Reuters. Omnia Aboul Gassim, a student who had sat her examinations at the institution just one day before the strike, described the destruction in stark terms to Reuters, saying the entire faculty had been ruined and that students felt their dreams and futures had been shattered with it.
In South Kordofan, the violence has been concentrated in different areas. Dilling locality was the principal hotspot with 242 attacks, or 31 percent of the state's total, followed by Kadugli with 107 attacks (14 percent) and Al Quoz with 94 (12 percent). The distribution suggests multiple, competing pressure points rather than a single decisive battleground.
Attacks in West Kordofan have been spread more evenly across localities, with Babnusa recording the highest number at 142, followed by En Nuhud at 119, Al Khiwai at 112 and Abu Zabad at 111. The diffuse pattern of violence in the state points to a conflict waged across a wide geographic area rather than concentrated on one strategic prize.
Responsibility for the attacks is not evenly divided. Between April 15, 2023 and September 19, 2026, the SAF was associated with just over half of all recorded attacks — 52 percent — compared with 34.7 percent attributed to the RSF and 13.3 percent to other actors. However, that balance has shifted over the course of the war, illustrating how momentum has ebbed and flowed between the two main belligerents.
The SAF was linked to more recorded attacks than the RSF during the first year and a half of the conflict, before the RSF overtook it in attack numbers from late 2024 through mid-2025. Since August 2025, the monthly attack counts for the two sides have converged, with the SAF generally recording slightly more — even as the overall number of attacks across the country has fallen sharply.
The intensification of fighting in Kordofan followed a significant turning point in the war: the fall of el-Fasher in October 2025, the last major Darfur city held by the army and its allies. With Darfur largely under RSF control, attention shifted eastward to Kordofan, which forms a corridor between the paramilitary group's western heartland and the army-held centre, north and east.
The region's geography explains much of its importance. Kordofan lies directly between RSF-held Darfur and the army's power centres, making it both a potential avenue of advance for the RSF and a defensive buffer for the SAF. Control of the corridor could shape the war's next phase, determining whether the RSF can threaten Khartoum from a new direction or whether the army can consolidate its hold on central Sudan.
For civilians caught in the middle, the consequences have been severe. The frequency of drone strikes, the damage to civilian infrastructure and the displacement that follows each new round of fighting have turned parts of Kordofan into some of the most dangerous places in the country. With neither side appearing capable of a decisive breakthrough, the region is likely to remain a focal point of the conflict for the foreseeable future, its towns and localities serving as the front line in a war that has already reshaped much of Sudan.
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